Anonymous authentication schemes, mostly based on the notion of group signatures, allow a group member to obtain membership from a server and gain access rights if the member can prove their authenticity to the verifier. However, existing authentication schemes are impractical because they neglect to provide an exclusive verification of the blacklist. In addition, the schemes are unaware of malicious members who are involved in privilege transferring. In this paper, a novel membership authentication scheme providing detection of membership transfer and proof of membership exclusiveness to the blacklist is proposed.
Introduction
The rapid development of the Internet has resulted in an increase in electronic transactions that allow users to buy goods or services from online platforms provided by Internet companies, including Google, Facebook, eBay, and Twitter.
Service providers must confirm whether a user is permitted to access its resource. Access control [1] [2] provides a solution by verifying either a cryptographic certificate or a username and password. However, the information provided by the user during an interaction with the service provider may undermine the user privacy: the user must risk being traced or even impersonated by corrupt service providers.
Group signatures [3] [7] , the verifier can check the member's access rights by using the group public key without knowing the member's identity. The member obtains access to the service if their presented signature is verified to be valid. If necessary, the signature can be opened by a specific group manager to identify the signature's originator in case of a dispute. Several provably secure authentication schemes [8] [9] [10] [11] have been proposed to create anonymous memberships in which any member of a group can prove to the service provider (i.e., the verifier) that they are qualified to access a service or file; however, these schemes are impractical because they do not provide exclusive verification of revoked memberships. As proven by the fact that some members have been revoked, in contrast to the use of fixed time periods [12] by employing a one-way chain, Ateniese et al. [13] require group members to prove that their membership does not appear on the current certificate revocation list (CRL).
However, in their scheme, the verifier must check whether the member's membership fits any of the revocation information on the CRL in turn by using their "REVOKE" algorithm every time a member requests membership authentication. The cost to the group manager is proportional to the number of revoked group members because issuing new memberships to non-revoked members is required every time a membership is revoked. Clearly, the scheme performs inefficiently and has not been improved to date.
Additionally, state-of-the-art authentication schemes provide few revocation methods without describing how to detect malicious members' illegal behavior; in other words, such schemes are unaware of malicious members who have been involved in privilege transfer. This is known as impersonation or an illegal privilege transfer attack and is a priority for prevention because it regularly occurs in the aforementioned schemes and is difficult to trace. In addition, the modern authentication schemes are becoming more complicated to ensure security.
However, this is not a favorable development because it will obstruct the development of membership authentication schemes, resulting in research becoming impractical and unattractive. In summary, a robust authentication scheme should contain two components: a membership authentication approach that can withstand members who engage in membership transfer and proof of membership that is exclusive to the current CRL.
In this paper, a novel membership authentication scheme is proposed that provides a simple solution for membership authentication and revocation. The proposed scheme may suffer from the disadvantage of illegal privilege transfer; however, this problem can easily be solved by employing the traitor tracing technique [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] . Traitor tracing was first suggested by [14] , which discusses how to identify a traitor in a public key cryptographic scheme and proposes some approaches for revoking access rights for at least one of the traitors involved in illegal privilege transfer. To evade accountability, a traitor may attempt to modify their secret key to avoid being traced. Traitor tracing
schemes ensure that no such strategy can succeed, and the schemes guarantee that the traitor's identity is revealed. Typical CRL approaches are not directly applicable to our proposed scheme because the memberships are anonymous and unlinkable. Instead of compiling a typical CRL, the dynamic accumulator technique [19] [20] [21] is employed in the proposed scheme to enable an eligible member to prove the exclusiveness of their membership on the CRL.
Organization of the Thesis
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the anonymous authentication scheme and its requirements as well as the dynamic accumulators. An anonymous and unlinkable membership authentication scheme with illegal privilege transfer detection is proposed in Section 3. Security and performance analysis of the proposed scheme is detailed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 presents the conclusion.
Background

Anonymous Authentication Schemes
Group signatures [12] [13] with membership revocation are typically defined using the following algorithms:
Setup:
A probabilistic algorithm that outputs the group public key and group secret key for the group manager, given a security parameter as the input.
Join:
A protocol between the group manager and a user that results in the user becoming a group member and receiving a group signing key.
Sign:
A probabilistic algorithm that outputs an anonymous membership for a member, with some necessary parameters (including the member's group signing key) as the input.
Verify:
An algorithm for examining the validity of an alleged membership with respect to a group public key.
Open:
An algorithm, which can only be implemented by the group manager, used to determine the originator's identity.
Some authentication schemes [10] [11] have been proposed for creating anonymous memberships by extending the idea of group signatures. Three parties are involved in generic authentication schemes, namely the prover (i.e., the member), issuer (i.e., the key generation center [KGC]), and verifier (i.e., the application server [AS] ). The issuer is assumed to be a trusted third party responsible for generating unique and anonymous memberships for eligible provers. A prover with membership can prove to the verifier that they have been given an appropriate membership. The verifier can verify the validity of memberships, but knows nothing about the prover's real identity. The scheme must guarantee that different authentication messages submitted by the same prover cannot be linked.
Additionally, the following security requirements, which have been identified and discussed in the literature, should be inspected.
Unforgeability:
Only an eligible prover can obtain a unique valid membership. An adversary cannot feasibly forge a membership that can obtain verification.
Strong/weak unlinkability: Strong unlinkability ensures that the pseudonym and real identity of a prover cannot be linked during multiple uses of the membership. Conversely, weak unlinkability allows only a pseudonym but not the prover's real identity to be linked when the prover uses the membership more than once.
Nontransferability: Even though the verifier knows nothing about the prover's real identity during the interactions; however, a sound authentication scheme must guarantee that membership transfer behavior can be detected and abused memberships can be revoked.
Excludability: Neither a group member nor the group manager can sign on behalf of other group members.
For efficient exclusive verification of the CRL and detection of illegal privilege transfer, the following attractive security properties are necessary:
Dynamic membership:
The membership can easily be updated by any eligible member of the group when inserting (deleting) a new (abusive) member rather than issuing a new membership or requiring the verifier to refer to the CRL.
Traitor detection: The scheme must be able to determine the real identity of the malicious member.
Dynamic Reversed Accumulator
Accumulators were first proposed by Benaloh and de Mare [22] for combining a set of members' specific values into one accumulator. Each corresponding member is assigned a unique witness, which is used to prove the validity of their membership. However, the computational complexity of the Benaloh-de Mare scheme increases linearly, either according to the number of group members or the number of revoked members. In 2002, Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [19] proposed an efficient dynamic accumulator scheme in which members can update their witness dynamically without the authority's help. Additionally, the computational complexity of inserting and deleting a member as well as updating members' witnesses is independent of the number of accumulated values. In 2009, Camenisch et al. proposed an additional accumulator scheme [20] that involves using a bilinear cryptography technique. However, the schemes in [19] [20] were later proved insecure by Kuo et al. [21] In this section, we review the dynamic reversed accumulator scheme of Kuo et al. [21] , which relies on the strong RSA assumption [7] [27]. To the best of our knowledge, their scheme is the most efficient and secure accumulator scheme for state-of-the-art dynamic accumulators and is highly applicable for the granting and revoking of privileges.
Initialization:
Let the modulus n p q = × , with p and q safe primes; U be a set of t eligible members, each with an identity u x ( 1, , u t =  ); and U  be a set of members being revoked. All identities are assumed to be pairwise relatively prime, and the authority maintains the sets U and U  , which are initially empty. The authority chooses an element n g QR ∈ and a prime z (which can be 2); computes the accumulator as
, where 1 g ≠ ; and publishes ( )
Here,
( ) f ⋅ is a public quasi−commutative function [21] . It holds that
, , , , mod
, , , mod .
To include a new member w x , the authority examines whether w x U ∉ , and Here, the accumulator ACC is not changed; therefore, the group members do not need to update their witnesses.
Witness verification:
Only an eligible member u x U ∈ can prove the validity of their system access to a verifier, that their unique value u x is included in the public accumulator ACC, and that they know the corresponding witness u wit on the basis of the zero-knowledge proof technique. The verifier can verify the correctness by using the online public information ACC maintained by the authority, and the group member u x is granted access rights if the following Equation (1) holds for their claim:
Member deletion:
When the membership of group member v x is revoked, the authority deletes 
Proposed Anonymous Authentication Scheme
In this section, a basic scheme of anonymous membership authentication with anonymity, unlinkability, and efficiency is proposed. Furthermore, we discuss its security. Subsequently, an enhanced version of the scheme is accordingly proposed, and this scheme is analyzed in the next section. The member must additionally establish a secure channel with the verifier in contrast to the aforementioned authentication schemes; in other words, a lower layer node-to-node secure channel with randomized encryption is assumed.
Bilinear Groups and Security Assumptions
The following definition of a bilinear map comes from [28] and is a fundamental building block of our proposed scheme. Let ( ) 
, ab e aP bQ e P Q = .
• Nondegeneracy: ( )
The proposed membership authentication scheme can be operated in both symmetric and asymmetric settings. For greater efficiency, the symmetric setting is more appropriate, whereas the asymmetric setting has greater security. Here, we directly use the asymmetric setting to enrich our cryptanalysis content in Section 4 and demonstrate the flexibility of our proposed scheme.
The security of our scheme relies on the hardness of the following problems, which were introduced in [29] . 
Both problems FAPI-j (for j = 1 or 2) have a unique solution for each given 
Basic Scheme
In this section, we first introduce a basic anonymous authentication scheme comprising three parties, namely the group member, KGC, and AS. A KGC is a trusted third party responsible for issuing private keys to all valid members, and
an AS provides services to any eligible member with proof of valid membership.
The basic scheme comprises the following algorithms:
Setup.
As mentioned in Section 3. gains access to AS's services if the scheme works correctly and Equation (3) holds: 
Remarks and Discussion Impersonation or illegal privilege transfer attack.
A sound anonymous membership authentication scheme should consider how to counteract a forged membership duplication to others from a valid 
If Equation (5) The KGC then tests whether any ( ) whether the received authentication message was generated by privileged member i U . Clearly, the authentication message generated from a transformed private key with 1 γ ≠ will fail to pass the verification, and we can conclude that someone has transferred their membership to someone else. The KGC knows nothing regarding the malicious member's real identity, which is known as "weak unlinkability." In a medium-sized setting with a moderately large number of members, the described online investigation might be possible if not performed frequently. However, this method cannot completely prevent illegal privilege transfer attack.
Replay attack.
This basic scheme cannot withstand the replay attack.
Enhanced Version of the Proposed Scheme
Consider the potential illegal privilege transfer attack and unpreventable replay attack mentioned in Section 3.2.
1. An enhanced scheme is proposed in this section. The scheme features anonymity and unlinkabilty and guarantees security against the aforementioned attacks. Because some algorithms are identical to those defined in Section 3.2, including Setup and Join, this section describes only the differences. The algorithms of the enhanced scheme are detailed as follows:
Sign. 2) Let V T be the current timestamp of the AS and td T be an appropriate tolerance in the time delay. Given the group public key Y, the AS can verify the membership proof presented by a member i U , and i U is granted access rights if the following Equations ((8) and (9)) hold; otherwise, the AS rejects the request of i U :
The scheme enables the AS to validate i U 's claim while learning nothing about their real identity, even if it colludes with the KGC. For the purpose of anonymous authentication and strong unlinkability, two blinding factors and a timestamp are employed so that a member can prove their membership multiple times to the same or to a different AS. All the authentication messages
cannot be linked to reveal that they are all generated by the same member. Cryptanalysis of this enhanced scheme is presented in Section 4.
Detection of Illegal Privilege Transfer
The member i U is assumed to be able to send the transformed private key { } 
The KGC checks whether any i π equals i λ to determine whether the received authentication message was generated by privileged member i U . Clearly, the aforementioned authentication message generated from a transformed private key with 1 γ ≠ fails to pass the verification. We can conclude that the received authentication message is an impersonated membership and that someone has shared their private key and privilege with another, but the KGC does not know who is the traitor at this stage because the proposed authentication scheme provides "anonymity". Consequently, the KGC uses the information ( i a , 
The KGC subsequently examines all values of i b , for 1 i N ≤ ≤ , to determine whether any i θ equals ( )
, i e P b Q and thus discover the real identity and revoke the membership of the traitor i U who is involved in an unauthorized privilege transfer. This online detection approach can be performed regularly in case the AS has noticed that an unauthorized privilege transfer has occurred in the system.
Exclusiveness of the Membership
By employing the dynamic reversed accumulator of Kuo 
Performance and Security Analysis
This section verifies our claim of an efficient, anonymous, and unlinkable membership authentication scheme. We first detail the security properties provided by our scheme. Note that some properties have been detailed in the aforementioned sections.
Resistance of replay attack
An adversary may attempt to resend a stolen membership tuple to pass verification. Recall that AS accepts a membership proof if Equation (8) ∈   such that ( ) ( ) 1  2  1  2  1  2  1  1   2  2  1  2   ; ; , , , 
If the adversary m  has ever joined the group, they may attempt to add a random number γ to the private key ( ) 
□
Finally, Table 1 illustrates the substantial improvement of our proposed scheme compared with other schemes for the security concerns that we mentioned and defined in Section 2.1. Our proposed scheme features strong unlinkability, nontransferability, dynamic membership, and traitor detection. Table 2 shows the main enhancement in efficiency achieved by our scheme. The computational cost of our scheme comprises that of the presented anonymous authentication scheme and the dynamic reversed accumulator of Kuo et al. [21] .
Conclusion
We propose a novel membership authentication scheme through which anonymity, strong unlinkability, and illegal privilege transfer detection are prove their membership exclusiveness of the CRL to the verifier. Additionally, the practicality and attractiveness of our proposed scheme is supported.
